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and the 'Utilitarians' are virtually agreed upon one point. The Paley theology was in a hopeless position. . . . The arguments from design and from miracles are radically incoherent. They confuse a scientific with a philosophical argument, and cannot lead legitimately to proving the existence of a supreme or moral ruler of the universe. While accepting scientific methods, they are radically opposed to scientific results, because they tend to prove intervention instead of order, and disappear as scientific knowledge extends." The Utilitarians insisted that religion must conform to the facts, the Liberals maintained that it must also satisfy the philosophical imagination and the emotions, and to the dogmatists "a religion appeared essentially as a system of discipline or a great social organism, governing men's passions and providing them with a cult and a concrete vision of the universe." To found a religion which shall harmoniously combine these elements, if such a harmony be possible, is a problem for the future.

Mr. Stephen has given us in these volumes a vast store of information and discussion, set forth in a style which makes the reading of them a continual pleasure; and the book as a whole is one which will have a permanent value for every student of the subjects with which it deals.

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THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL. Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Aberdeen. First Series. *The Four Historical Conceptions of Being*. By Josiah Royce. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1900. Pp. xvi, 588.

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL. Second Series. *Nature, Man and the Moral Order*. 1901. Pp. xvii, 480.

The volumes before us offer nothing less than a complete system of philosophy. In them Professor Royce has gathered up the threads of all his previous philosophical discussions and woven them into a single complete and, in many respects, decidedly novel system of absolute idealism. This is the most elaborate, sustained and closely knit effort in philosophical construction that has appeared in many a year. It is a work of scholastic subtlety

and exhaustiveness, and, we must also add, not wholly free from scholastic prolixity.

The first volume is concerned mainly with the World, the second mainly with the Individual; the first with pure theory,—the meaning of reality in general, the second with the application of that theory to the interpretation of the facts of nature and of man. More specifically, the first volume contains an exhaustive discussion of the concept of Being; the scope of the second “includes a sketch of an idealistic Theory of Human Knowledge, an outline of a Philosophy of Nature, a doctrine about the Self, a discussion of the origin and destiny of the Human Individual, a summary consideration of the world as a Moral Order, a study of the Problem of Evil, and, finally, an estimate of all these views in the light of what seem (to the author) to be the interests of Natural Religion” (II., p. vi).

Naturally it is impossible to condense into review-length a summary of the contents of a work conceived on such a generous plan, and equally impossible to present any adequate criticism of steps in the argument that seem to provoke further discussion. Besides, there is a baffling serenity and self-confidence in the author's manner that make one pause before urging his objections. One feels that his difficulties cannot have been ignored, that his is a point of view that he must find subsumed and transcended somewhere in the course of the discussion if he only search hard enough. When he comes like Indra in the Indian tale to the wise Prajapati with a difficulty, saying, “Master, I see no good in this,” he hears ever the same bland reply: “Abide with me yet another thirty years.” One feels, in short, that the doubts which remain after a fourth reading a fortieth might dispel. This feeling is intensified by our author's persistent and conscientious endeavor to scrutinize his own doctrine from all conceivable points of view that differ from his own. The “objector” is always given the courtesy of the house. Whatever his trouble he is pretty sure to find himself at some time occupying the floor, and stating his own case with exceptionally convincing power.* Whether or not one finds the author's replies equally convincing, it is apparent that the view set forth gains much, perhaps too much commanding force from the discovery that no serious obstacles in the way of its acceptance have been coolly and deliberately ignored.

It is a very old and very familiar criticism of Absolute Ideal-

ism, of whatever type, that it leaves no room for the reality of the individual, and, therefore, no room for a genuinely ethical order; that, furthermore, precisely in so far as it fails to provide for the reality of the individual as independent and free at least in his capacity as judge of truth, in just so far does it leave its own conclusions without force, and so, as theoretical philosophy also, defeat its own end. Many and subtle are the defenses that idealists have brought forward, until the question appears well-nigh threadbare. Professor Royce, however, considers the criticism still a respectable one. He had already faced the issue in his interesting discussion in the California Controversy (*The Conception of God*) and in some of the papers in his "Studies in Good and Evil." In the present work he has given us an independent and exhaustive treatment of the whole question, in which he undertakes "to define God, the World, and the finite Individual, and the most fundamental relations that link them together." The problem concerning the nature of the individual, and the kind of reality to be ascribed to the individual, is held to be involved in the deeper problem: what is the exact meaning of reality in general. The fundamental question then is, what is the real *qua* real? Professor Royce's answer is given in the first volume. It takes the form of a constructive criticism of three historically important ontological positions that have been maintained by philosophers: that of Realism, that of Mysticism and that of "modern Critical Rationalism,"—under which last rubric fall alike the critical idealism of Kant and the Empiricism of later English writers. The author undertakes to show that each of these three positions recognizes a permanently valid aspect of the truth while denying other aspects no less permanently valid; that, taken together, they prepare the way for the fourth—the author's own—conception of reality, which is called "the synthetic or the constructively idealistic conception of what it is to be."

The common mark of all realistic systems is the assertion that "to be real means to be independent of ideas, which, while other than a given real being, still relate to that being" (p. 92). Realism asserts that objects are real "whether or no" you, or anyone else, may be aware of them; that being is entirely independent of ideas, and also that ideas, as mere ideas, *i. e.*, apart from their truth or falsity, are independent of being. Taking the realistic thesis, as thus characterized, strictly, Professor Royce has no diffi-

culty in showing that it introduces in its notion of entire independence a fatal chasm which it can neither destroy nor bridge; that, in consequence, the would-be real world itself vanishes, and leaves behind a "meaningless wilderness of absolute nothingness." To put the difficulty otherwise, Realism makes hard and fast the distinction between the *what* and the *that* of things. Now this distinction while important and real is, none the less, an abstraction, and, if taken absolutely, leaves us with neither a *what* nor a *that* remaining.

The position of the Mystic is described with a fine fairness that evidently issues from a fond appreciation of its value. Our author seems almost reluctant to point out the fatal defect of inner contradiction which this view contains. The Mystic holds that "*to be means to fulfill the inner purpose of ideas*. What is, is as such the perfect, the absolute, the finality" (I., p. 386). To be real means to be in such wise immediate that, in the presence of this immediacy, all thought and all ideas, absolutely satisfied, are quenched so that the finite search ceases, and the Other is no longer another, but is absolutely found. In all finitude is dissatisfaction, unrest. The real in so far as found brings rest and satisfaction; the absolutely real would bring final rest and satisfaction,—the finite would be quenched in the immediacy of the ineffable experience. Now the Mystic indeed holds that this experience is just the opposite of nothingness, "for it is fulfilment, attainment, peace, the goal of life—in a word, all Truth." And yet, inasmuch as he always defines his absolute in negative terms the contrast between the finite life of struggle and the goal is an absolute one. The real, conceived simply as goal, gets its meaning in the contrast with finitude, and if it is to be in reality different from nothing, it must be shown to stand in real contrast with our own *real though finite* life.

The Critical Idealist sees that "our ideas of Being and the Being of which we have ideas must occupy essentially the same ontological position" (I., p. 260)—a truth denied by both the Realist and the Mystic. He sees, moreover, that the assertion that the world is "involves a judgment that (his) present experience is interwoven in the whole context of the realm of valid or of possible experience" (I., p. 248). Knowing the truth consists in reading off the structure of an actually presented experience and thereby discovering a realm of abstractly possible experience (I., p. 257 ff.). In asserting the reality of any fact of

experience one simply asserts the validity of a certain idea about further possible experience. But this view fails to tell us "what is a valid or determinately possible experience at the moment when it is supposed to be only possible;" fails to tell us what a valid truth is "at the moment when nobody verifies its validity" (I., p. 260). The validity of an idea that is tested gets an individual life and meaning by appearing in an individual experience; but what of the "realm of valid truth in general," of the world of nature not presented, and perhaps never to be exhaustively presented in our human experience? (I., p. 261).

Thus by a consideration of these partially true views and their specific defects, Professor Royce leads up to the synoptic view of constructive idealism. The apparently external meaning of an idea, its reference to another, is obviously very largely determined by the selective purpose of the idea itself. Facts are stubborn controllers of ideas only with the ideas' own connivance. Professor Royce, however, undertakes to show that the real to which ideas refer is not only in part but wholly determined by the internal meaning of the ideas. The idea is always a will, a plan of action; and the object, the real, to which it refers is always just the idea's own conscious purpose embodied in some more determinate form than it now consciously possesses. No finite embodiment is, however, finally adequate. The true internal meaning of any finite idea is a certain absolute system of ideas.

We have not the space to give in any detail the steps whereby this position is independently reached. So far as we now have the conception before us it does not seem to differ very essentially from the view which students of philosophy are familiar with from the writings of Kant and his immediate followers. And, for my part, I must confess that I find the discussion of the Third Conception far from satisfactory. What is there described as the position of Critical Idealism is perhaps a fair account of the attitude of John Stuart Mill, but hardly of the Kantians. Reality for them is not left hanging in the void in company with a lot of abstractly possible but never to be realized alternatives, until the definite experience comes that fixes it in the concrete. It is only in so far as future events may be regarded as at the present moment not completely determined (and for Professor Royce also there are such real alternatives) that real occurrences are left suspended in the limbo of possibilities. In all other respects the real is just the completely elaborated implications of

any present fact. But our author's view does differ from Critical Rationalism in two important respects: (1) in the persistent emphasis of the active aspect of ideas, and the consequent conception of reality as the purpose accomplished, the plan fulfilled; and (2) in holding that the complete meaning of every finite idea is once for all individuated, completely determined, embodied in a wholly adequate empirical content. In a word, whatever your idea, you mean the Absolute, you mean God. And God sees at a glance, *totum simul*, "the one plan fulfilled through all the manifold lives, the single consciousness winning its purpose by virtue of all the ideas, of all the individual selves, and of all the lives" (I., p. 427, cf. Ib., pp. 36, 327, 339, 359, etc.).

This latter aspect of the doctrine, however, whereby our author would preserve the not yet verified facts by giving them a local habitation and a name in the eternally verified, *totum simul*, experience of the Absolute, seems to have been reached by an all too easy transition from the consciousness of just this individual seeker after truth to a supposed single and all-inclusive consciousness. What our argument has shown is that every idea is a partially fulfilled purpose; that, further, just this individual seeker after truth can know when experience gives the larger, more complete embodiment of his purpose; he thus knows relative reality, and he applies the standard which shows that he, as this individual experiencer, possesses the finally complete measure of truth. In other words, it is just this individual life that is his, and while it remains his, that expands to the fullness of the complete life. So we are not entitled to infer from this that the empirical world is "a life fulfilling the purpose of *our* ideas" (I., p. 368). Nor should we say: "As really one with its object, my idea in seeking its Other seeks only the expression of its own will in *an* empirical and conscious life" (I., p. 387). Clearly, we should here write "its" for "an." Now it is just by such apparently insignificant substitutions as this that we reach our one omniverous Absolute. Where we need to be particularly on our guard is precisely at this point when we come to view the relation of the individual conscious life conceived in its totality to other individual lives, similarly conceived, and to the Absolute. I am not unmindful of the arguments whereby Professor Royce would exhibit the individual as the object of exclusive interest. But, in spite of his interesting discussion of the individuality of the beloved to the lover, it remains clear that all the deeper human

relations show that we have in this notion but a partial and inadequate account of the principle of individuation. Nor do I overlook the arguments by which he proves that for me the Other which I am incessantly seeking both in the natural world and in the world of social relations is always the larger and inclusive self, the complete embodiment of my present purpose. But from another point of view, my own purpose fails of its fulfillment, at least in the case of the social relations, unless I and my fellows are contrasted, distinct and independent. This our author explicitly states (*cf.* II., p. 271). Now must not the same thing be true when we speak of the relation of this individual self to the absolute self? In which case we could not speak of the Absolute as expressing his purpose in my life, except in the sense in which I could speak of expressing my purpose in the lives of my fellow-men. Professor Royce would save his absolute from the fate of the mystics' real by making it include in its own being all the infinite wealth of finite expressions, precisely as they are in our finite human lives. Only, he adds, God sees each finite expression in its relations to all others, sees them all *totum simul*, as the complete expression of his single purpose. Now in this last assertion we over-emphasize the Unity of the Absolute to such an extent that, in spite of our repeated assertions to the contrary, we introduce an element of illusoriness into the finite world. Our Absolute is supposed actually to live in the finite, to seek with the seeker, to be baffled when the seeker is baffled, to know not the future at this present moment when for him who lives in this moment the future is unknown. Then, however, we turn around and say: But, from another point of view, all time, with all its contents, for the Absolute simultaneously now is, is the one complete definitive embodiment of the one divine plan (*cf.* II., p. 148). (I can only in passing refer to the interesting, subtle and illuminating discussion of Time and Eternity as contained in this chapter and regret the lack of space to analyze the argument with special reference to this problem of the human individual). Is not this to make God win his way after all by playing a very subtly elaborated game of hide-and-seek with himself?

This is the crucial point in this philosophy,—the application of the theory to the human individual and to the determination of the place of the self in Being; the point specifically discussed in the seventh and eighth chapters of the second series,—the key chapters to both volumes. I must here enter a protest against

the summary fashion in which our author throughout the work lumps together all types of pluralists and forces them to keep company with the most crude and naïve realists and share their hard lot. Surely the subtler thinkers of this type, including even Leibniz (spite of the "windowless monads"), have seen that their independent reals could not be "chopped off with a hatchet." With regard to the dependence, independence and interdependence of their many real beings they have more or less clearly seen that one must pass beyond the *entweder-oder* level of thinking where they believe the strict realist is stranded. The pluralistic idealist does not maintain that his real beings are absolutely independent, in the sense that they are out of all relation to one another, or indifferent to such relation; but he does maintain that relations are intelligible which are in no wise limitations of the members related, that strictly voluntary association is real, and that furthermore we are not by reason forced to carry our formal logic-machine into the heavens to get a bird's eye view which will make all these members moments, of however long "time-span," in the life of a single race self-hood, and give them their whole reality as such. Or, at any rate, if we are forced to take this flight to make our meaning clear, we must ever be mindful of the fact that in so doing we are really entering the world of abstraction, and that, to use the language of our author, to make this abstraction the real world is precisely to defeat the very purpose of the idea that inspired the flight. To make our meaning finally clear we must continually return to the concrete experience of the actual unity in actual independence of self with self. Our author's own epistemology, in its recognition of the part played by the "acknowledgment" of the ethically controlled will in the determination of the facts of the individual's world, has decidedly pluralistic implications when we remember that the will in question is not that of a race selfhood, but that of this individual human self.

Professor Royce shows in a very striking manner the confusing ambiguities attaching to the notion of the self and then points out that the "nobler self," the self of eternal worth that strenuous morality affirms, is not found in some underlying soul-substance, but in the unity of one's life purpose, in the uniqueness of one's task. The self is properly defined in ethical terms (II., pp. 267 ff., 276). Such a self cannot be regarded as caused or teleologically determined by another, for that would be to make this my

life the expression of a purpose "in some sense *not* my private or individual purpose" (II., p. 329). Thus I the individual exist in one aspect as the expression of nobody's will but my own. Yet I am also an expression of the one divine will. The apparent contradiction here our author thinks is removed by the discovery that it is my will, just as my individual will, that has its place in the Absolute (II., p. 330). It is this view of the human individual, he holds, that furnishes the basis for our belief that man is free and the world a moral order. But then we find our author going on to give us a theory to account for the genesis and temporal origin of the self. The argument here rests upon the analogy with the rise of a new sort of self-hood in the development of the empirical ego within the range of our human experience and seems to me to suffer from the defects usually incident to this type of argument. With that, however, I am not here concerned, but rather with the contradiction involved in holding to the origin empirical or logical of that which is, we are told, neither causally nor teleologically determined, of the ethical self whose conscious purpose is an eternal mission.

In brief, my difficulty is this: I fail to see how we can save ourselves from the mystic's fate unless we can keep God and persons on the same ontological plane, and this we do not accomplish unless the many selves are also eternally real and underived.

Moreover, our author, in his Supplementary Essay, has developed a view that not merely meets Bradley's objections to the possibility of putting positive content into the notion of the Absolute, but also prepares the way for the formulation of his own doctrine in a more pluralistic, more concrete and valid way than he seems willing to employ. In this essay, drawing upon the recent mathematical discussions of the concept of the infinite, Professor Royce has shown how the Absolute may be conceived as a self-representative system, and as such an infinite series may be regarded as given at a stroke, in the very purpose that defines the system, although, serially regarded, there will and can be no last term." But such an infinite series he further shows to be one of many infinite series within the same system. Here we have in these many infinite series the analogue, but only a rough analogue, of the ethical selves. But then we cannot speak of such selves as having a temporal origin.

There are many important and novel features of this philosophy which we have had to pass over in silence. Particularly note-

worthy are: the deduction of the categories, the discussion of the logical origin of the contrast between the "world of description" and the "world of appreciation" and the illustration of these two points of view by the mathematical doctrine of the two forms of serial order, and the whole section on the philosophy of nature.

Where so much is given perhaps it is hardly fair that more should be required, but I regret that our author did not find time to bring into sharper contrast with his own doctrine the views which it most closely resembles, as for example the views of Hegel and Fichte and Plato. Very considerable portions of the work might be read as a commentary on Plato's idea of the good as the object of knowledge. We might well place historically one important phase of this view by saying that Professor Royce has read his Fichte with the eyes of Plato, and his Plato with the eyes of Fichte, and then recast the result in the light of recent mathematical discussions of the concept of the infinite.

The author's answer to all such doubts as we have been raising has been given in advance: They "are founded upon a failure to grasp our doctrine of Being in its wholeness," they arise from "persistently dwelling now too exclusively upon this and now too abstractly upon that aspect of our theory, and neglecting to regard the meaning of all its aspects together" (II., p. 337). I am not sure that the answer would not be fair. One must have a large thought-span, must be, in short, in our author's sense, a godlike person to be able to hold before his consciousness *totum simul* all the phases of this subtle and intricate philosophy.

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A SKETCH OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT FROM THALES TO KANT. By Ludwig Noiré. London: Macmillan & Co. Pp. 359.

It may be doubted whether it was advisable to reissue Mr. Noiré's introduction to Prof. Max Müller's translation of Kant's "Kritik" as an independent work. In the first place, neither philosophy nor the history of philosophy has stood still during the twenty years since 1881, and Mr. Noiré's book is, by an inevitable consequence, in many points already antiquated.